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SEPARATION OF POWERS CONFLICTS IN THE
"REFORM" OF ARKANSAS WORKERS'
COMPENSATION LAW
J. Thomas Sullivan*

L

Introduction

The Arkansas General Assembly enacted a comprehensive statutory revision of the state's workers' compensation system in 1993,'
in response to pressure for reform.2 The resulting legislation not
* Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law. B.A.,
University of Texas; J.D., Southern Methodist University; L.L.M., University of Texas.
Copyright © 1994, by the author.
1 1993 Ark. Acts 796 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 11-9-101 to -1001 (Michie
Supp. 1993)).
2 Some pressures for "reform" have included the wholesale revision of tort recovery systems, particularly in the areas of workers' compensation and medical malpractice. Other "reform" models have focused upon specific aspects of litigation, such as
the capping of damage awards, limitation of punitive damages awards or tightening of
statutes of limitation to avoid application of the discovery rule in malpractice actions.
Philip Pesek et al., The New Workers' Compensation Law: What Happens Now?, ARK. LAw.,
Summer 1993, at 20 (journal of the Arkansas Bar Association). Tort reform began as
early as 1985 in some jurisdictions. See The Tort Movemnt's Progress Across the Nation,
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 9, 1992, at 35 (national survey of tort "reform" efforts among the
various jurisdictions). Several jurisdictions have experimented with extensive restructuring of their tort systems, apparently supported by national interest groups. Evidence of pressure for "reform" is also indicated by the formation of such groups as
the Civil Justice Reform Group. Reform War Chest, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 21, 1994, at B3.
The organization is comprised of 17 Fortune 500 companies, and its purpose is to aid
tort reform on the state level. Id. The group expects minimum contributions of
$100,000 from each member corporation. Id. The concept of tort reform is not limited to Arkansas. For example, New Jersey legislators are currently discussing tort
reform options. Tom Hester, Package Targets Lawsuits, STAR-LEDGER (Newark), Mar. 8,
1994, at 1; Russ Bleemer, Bills to Watch, 136 N.J.L.J. 670, 698 (Feb. 14, 1994) (Senator
Gerald Cardinale, Chairman of the NewJersey Senate Commerce Committee, intends
to introduce legislation that he describes as "tort reform."). This concept, however,
has met with opposition from the members of the NewJersey bar. HerbJaffe, Lawyers
React Quickly to Counter Tort Reform, STAR-LEDGER (Newark), Feb. 13, 1994, at 31;
Bleemer, supra at 698 (The New Jersey Chapter of the Association of Trial Lawyers of
America, through its President, Lee Goldsmith, refers to this proposed legislation not
as "tort-reform" as Senator Cardinale characterizes it, but rather as "tort abolition.").
For scholarly comment on tort reform in other jurisdictions, see Leonard J. Nelson,
Tort Reform in Alabama: Are Damages Restrictions Unconstitutional?,40 ALA. L. Rnv. 533
(1989) (discussing Alabama's tort reform); Marie D. Mendelson, Note, Tort Reform:
Ensuring The Most Equitable Results For Plaintiffs And Defendants?, 31 ARiz. L. REv. 171
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only reflects a more conservative approach toward recognition of
work-related injury, but also evidences an extreme agitation toward
the Arkansas courts with respect to the interpretation of the prior
Act that led to expansive construction of benefit eligibility and employee rights.' Apart from the substance of the changes that were
implemented, the legislation is particularly interesting because of
the direct attack on the judicial branch incorporated in the amending language itself.4 The General Assembly's forthright declaration of its primacy with regard to the creation and direction of the
compensation system may, in fact, represent a limited concern that
judicial and administrative decision-making is responsible for increases in claims, which ultimately increase the cost of compensation insurance for Arkansas employers. However, the struggle
between the legislative and judicial branches evident in the compensation reform legislation may reflect a deeper or broader sepa(1989) (discussing Arizona's tort reform); Thomas A. Finley et al., Tort Reform and
Medical Malpractice: Iowa's Past, Present, and Future, 36 DRAKE L. Rv. 669 (1987) (discussing Iowa's tort reform); Ray Chester, Adverse Effects of Texas Tort Reform on Settlement
in Multi-PartyCases, 10 REv. LITtG. 103 (1990) (discussing Texas' tort reform); Gregory
C. Sisk, The Constitutional Validity of the Modification of Joint and Several Liability in the
Washington Tort Reform Act of 1986, 13 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 433 (1990) (discussing
Washington's tort reform).
3 At least one informed observer attributes the General Assembly's adopting the
Act to frustration over judicial and administrative expansion of the concept of eligibility for compensation benefits which the General Assembly had sought to control in its
1986 revision of the workers' compensation law. SeeJoseph H. Purvis, From the Respondent: Workers' Compensation Reform: An Attempt to Save the Goose that Laid the Golden Egg,
ARK. LAw., Summer 1993, at 25-26. Purvis states that:
After the special session of 1986, employers felt most of the problems had
been solved and that the playing field would be once again leveled. This
was not to be, however, as the Arkansas appellate courts continued to
broaden the scope and coverage of workers' compensation and, in some
instances, seemed to opine that the language of the statute did not mean
what it seemed to clearly state.
Id. Consequently, the reforms of the Act are seen as directly responding to judicial
activism in liberally construing the terms of 1986 revision of the Act. The General
Assembly addressed the perceived problem of judicially and administratively expanding the compensation remedy by providing that "[a]ny and all case law inconsistent with the purposes set forth herein is specifically annulled." 1993 Ark. Acts 796,
§ 1 (not codified) (This provision appeared in the Act signed by the Governor of
Arkansas but does not appear in the Michie Supplement. In fact, the Michie Supplement in its historical note following ARK.

CODE ANN.

§ 11-9-101 (Michie Supp. 1993)

the editors point out "[a]s originally enacted ...this section provided, in part: [containing the above quote] .. ." but provides no explanation for the omission.)
4 1993 Ark. Acts 796, § 35 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-1001 (Michie Supp.
1993)); see infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
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ration of powers problem within the state. The tenor of the
General Assembly's language, more than the actual substance of

the revisions enacted, does permit the broader inference that legislators remain skeptical of the doctrine ofjudicial review. In recent
years, the Arkansas General Assembly, like other state legislative

bodies, has been pressured to "reform" state tort law.5 Some pressures for "reform" have included wholesale revision of tort recovery
systems, particularly in the areas of workers' compensation and

medical malpractice. 6 Other "reform" models have focused on

specific aspects of litigation, such as the capping of damage
awards,7 limitation of punitive damages awards' or tightening of
5 See supra note 2.

6 See Gail Javitt & Elaine Lu, Cappingthe Crisis: Medical Malpracticeand Tort Reform,
20 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 258 (1992) (discussing federal initiatives by the Bush
Administration to reform medical malpractice); Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal Standards Governing Physician Liability, 54 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87
(1991) (reviewing physician practice guidelines as a standard of care in medical malpractice actions); Mitchell S. Berger, Note, Following the Doctor's Orders-Capson Noneconomic Damages in Medical Malpractice Cases, 22 Rur.-CAM. L.J. 173 (1990) (analyzing
the attempt at malpractice reform to cure the "crisis" of malpractice insurance and
claims).
7 A number of state courts have rejected limitations or caps placed upon damage
awards as violative of state constitutional guarantees. See, e.g., Smith v. Department of
Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1087-89 (Fla. 1987) ($450,000 limit on non-economic damages
violates "open courts" provision of the Florida Constitution); Wright v. Central Du
Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 743 (Ill. 1976) ($500,000 limit on recovery constituted "special law" in violation of Illinois Constitution); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d
825, 836-38 (N.H. 1980) ($250,000 limit on non-economic damages violates equal
protection guarantee of New Hampshire Constitution); Arneson v. Olson, 270
N.W.2d 125, 135-36 (N.D. 1978) (striking $300,000 ceiling on recovery as violative of
equal protection clause of North Dakota Constitution); Duren v. Suburban Community Hosp., 482 N.E.2d 1358, 1361-63 (Ohio C.P. 1985) ($200,000 cap violated state
and federal constitutions); Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 688-89 (Tex. 1988)
(state supreme court responded to a certified question propounded by the United
States Circuit Court by rejecting a $500,000 cap on medical malpractice damages as
violative of the Texas Constitution). But seeJohnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 404
N.E.2d 585, 598-601 (Ind. 1980) (upholding $500,000 damages cap); Sibley v. Board
of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 462 So. 2d 149, 154-58 (La. 1985) ($500,000 cap
upheld).
8 Interestingly, challenges to punitive damages awards have been asserted as violative of federal constitutional protections in two recent decisions of the United States
Supreme Court. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991) (upholding
punitive damages award as consistent with due process in achieving state interest in
punishing offending defendant and deterring future wrongdoing likely to jeopardize
public); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S.Ct. 2711, 2718 (1993)
(observing that Fourteenth Amendment imposes substantive limits beyond which punitive damages may not extend). See also Keene Corp. v. Kirk, 870 S.W.2d 573, 581-82
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statutes of limitation to avoid application of "discovery" rules in
malpractice actions.9
A significant goal of the national tort reform movement is the
restructuring of state workers' compensation systems. A number of
jurisdictions have engaged in major changes to compensation
laws, 10 while reform efforts are in progress in others." In 1992, a
movement toward restructuring the Arkansas workers' compensation system prompted the creation of a reform committee. The
General Assembly charged this committee with considering
problems posed by then existing law under the direction of the
(Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (summarizing challenges to punitive damage awards imposed in
asbestos litigation and rejecting challenges to imposition of consecutive awards of punitive damages against single defendant based upon same general course of conduct).
9 For example, the Texas Legislature enacted the Professional Liability Insurance
for Physicians, Podiatrists and Hospitals Act in 1975, at least in part to stabilize malpractice premiums. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.15-1 (West 1981). In a separate but
related act, the Texas Legislature imposed a two year statute of limitations upon
claims brought on behalf of minors over the age of six, requiring all actions commenced by minors to be brought within two years of the alleged malpractice or by age
eight. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.82, § 4 (West Supp. 1976), repealed by 1977 Tex. Gen.
Laws 817 (and replaced by TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (West Supp.
1977) (providing that a minor under the age of 12 has until age 14 to file a health
care liability claim)). The Texas Supreme Court struck the minor statute of limitations as violative of the "Open Courts Doctrine." Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 667
(Tex. 1983) (citing TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13 ("All courts shall be open, and every person for injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy
by due course of law.")).
10 Texas overhauled its workers' compensation system in 1989, with the passage of
the 1989 Workers' Compensation Act. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8308-1.01 to 11.10 (West Supp. 1994). This Act was declared unconstitutional in Texas Workers'
Compensation Comm'n v. Garcia, and the constitutional portions were adjudged to be
unseverable from provisions struck. 862 S.W.2d 61, 103-04 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993). The
Texas Supreme Court has granted a writ of error to review the judgment of the intermediate court. Texas Workers' Compensation Comm'n v. Garcia, 862 S.W.2d 61
(Tex. Ct. App. 1993), appeal docketed, No. 04-91-00565-CV (Tex. Apr. 20, 1994). See
also David J. Rebein, The Kansas Response to the Crisis in Workers Compensation: An Overview of the 1993 Amendments to the Kansas Workers Compensation Ac4 J. KAN. BAR Ass'N,
June/July 1993, at 30; Steven W. Ford, New Alabama Workers' Compensation Act, 53 AlA.
LAw. 365 (1992) (both focusing on changes in state workers' compensation
legislation).
11 For example, California and Pennsylvania have both engaged in serious recent
legislative debate over reform or restructuring of their respective state workers' compensation systems. See, e.g., Workers' Comp Reform: What Does it Mean for CaliforniaAttorneys? CAL. LAw., Oct. 1993, at 98; Daniel V. DiLoretto, Re-working a Worn-Out System:
Reforms Ensure Changes A-Plenty for Practitioners,PA. LJ., July 19, 1993, at 5; John L.
Kennedy, LegislatureApproves Workers' Comp Proposa4 Compromise Legislation Attempts to
Squash FutureRate Increases, PA. L.J., June 21, 1993, at 6.
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Arkansas Insurance Commissioner. 12 The resulting bill adopted by
the General Assembly reflects a pro-employer bias. 3 This bias is
likely a result of the composition of the committee that reviewed
it.

14

.

The General Assembly's Rationalefor Change

In its effort to reform Arkansas workers' compensation law
and practice, the General Assembly sought to revitalize a system
that it perceived had become threatened by fiscal instability.1 5 The
12 See Pesek et a]., supra note 2, at 20 (for a thorough discussion of the history of
the reform commission's orientation and work). Insurance Commissioner Lee
Douglass formed the ad hoc committee that included representatives from labor,
management, and insurance, as well as the legal community. Id. In the Summer 1993
issue of the Arkansas Lawyer, a series of articles trace the history of the workers' compensation reform movement from neutral, management and labor perspectives, respectively. See id.; Joseph H. Purvis, From the Respondent: Workers' Compensation Reform:
An Attempt to Save the Goose that Laid the Golden Egg, ARs. LAw., Summer 1993, at 25
(focussing on the impact of the Act on employers); Zan Davis, From the Claimant:
Workers' Compensation Reform: Cutting Costs by EliminatingEmployees from Coverage, ARK.
LAw., Summer 1993, at 27 (focussing on the impact of the Act on employers).
13 1993 Ark. Acts 796 (enacting H. 1615, 79th Ark. Legis., Reg. Sess. (1993) and

codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 11-9-101 to -1001 (Michie Supp. 1993)). The Chamber

of Commerce drafted H. 1615 to replace the bill unanimously agreed to by the committee chaired by Arkansas Insurance Commissioner, Lee Douglass. Pesek et al.,
supra note 2, at 20. The Chamber's bill was viewed as considerably more anti-labor
than that produced by the ad hoc committee chaired by Commissioner Douglass. See
Davis, supra note 12, at 27. For a comprehensive treatment of the Act, see John D.
Copeland, The New Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act: Did the Pendulum Swing Too
Far?,47 ARYxL. REv. 1 (1994). Copeland concludes that this enactment has achieved
the goal of redressing employer concerns that liberal decisions of the Workers' Compensation Commission and Arkansas appellate courts have extended benefits to workers whose injuries were never intended to be compensated under the compensation
system, yet in doing so may have exposed employers to substantially greater liability
for claims arising in tort not subject to compensation under the more restrictive definitions of the Act. Id. at 89-90.
14 See Pesek et al., supra note 2, at 20 (observing that the committee formed by
Commissioner Douglass was dominated by management and industry representatives
who "carried the majority of votes [on contested provisions] and the result of their
work was a management oriented recommendation."). The committee actually reviewed a bill drafted by the Arkansas State Chamber of Commerce. Id. Chambers of
commerce are usually made up of businesses in the locale and are ardent supporters
of management, because their members are predominately employers and not
employees.
15 Purvis, supra note 12, at 25. The author notes "[a] s a result of all this [expansion
of benefit eligibility through commission and court interpretation of compensation
Act,] the crisis in workers' compensation continued to mushroom and it became readily apparent that many businesses that were supplying jobs to Arkansas workers were
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Assembly's action struck at existing judicial doctrine in three distinct ways, each reflecting dissatisfaction with the postures that the
state's appellate courts and administrative law system adopted in
administering the pre-existing workers' compensation system. 6
This legislative disapproval of the judiciary's interpretation of the
Workers' Compensation Act strikes at the very heart of the separation of powers doctrine. 7
A.

Assigning Blame to Judicial and Administrative Systems and
Restructuring the System

First, the General Assembly assigned blame for the avowed crisis in workers' compensation insurance 18 to judicial and administrative decision-making. These decisions expanded benefits and
access to the system by adopting rules essentially favoring claimants
over carriers in the claims resolution process.' 9 The Act expressly
blamed the expansion of remedies with the fiscal problems besetin danger of either going under, dropping workers' compensation insurance or moving to other states." Id. at 26.
16 Id. at 25.
17 For a discussion of the separation of powers issue, see infra part III.
18 The General Assembly set forth its rationale for restructuring the Arkansas
workers' compensation system in by providing, in pertinent part:
(b) The primary purposes of the workers compensation laws are to pay
timely temporary and permanent disability benefits to all legitimately injured workers that suffer an injury or disease arising out of and in the
course of their employment, to pay reasonable and necessary medical expenses resulting therefrom and then to return the worker to the
workforce, and to improve workplace safety through safety programs; improve health care delivery through use of managed care concepts; encourage the return to work of injured workers; deter and punish frauds of
agents, brokers, solicitors, employers and employees relating to procurement of workers' compensation coverage or the provision or denial of
benefits; curtail the rise in medical costs associated with the provision of
workers compensation benefits; and emphasize that the workers compensation system in this state must be returned to a state of economic viability.
1993 Ark. Acts 796, § 1 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-101(b) (Michie Supp.
1993)).
19 Purvis, supra note 12, at 25. In reviewing the General Assembly's action in restructuring the state's compensation Act, a defender of the "reforms" argued that the
crisis in the compensation system compelling the legislative action could be traced to
three long-term developments: (1) appellate court's traditional "liberal construction"
of compensation statutes in favor of claimants, expanding the definition of "compensable" claims; (2) increased medical costs associated with physician's fees that tend to
be unchallenged by administrative and judicial systems; and (3) increased fraud perpetrated by compensation claimants. Id.
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ting the state's industrial community. 20 The Act sets forth the General Assembly's explanation in the following terms:
The Seventy-Ninth General Assembly realizes that the Arkansas
workers' compensation statutes must be revised and amended
from time to time. Unfortunately, many of the changes made by
this act were necessary because administrative law judges, the
Workers' Compensation Commission, and the Arkansas courts
have continually broadened the scope and eroded the purpose
of the workers' compensation statutes of this state. The SeventyNinth General Assembly intends to restate that the major and
controlling purpose of workers' compensation is to pay timely
temporary and permanent disability benefits to all legitimately
injured workers that suffer an injury or disease arising out of
and in the course of their employment, to pay reasonable and
necessary medical expenses resulting therefrom, and then to return the worker to the work force. When, and if, the workers'
compensation statutes of this state need to be changed, the General Assembly acknowledges its responsibility to do so. It is the
specific intent of the Seventy-Ninth General Assembly to repeal,
annul, and hold for naught all prior opinions or decisions of
any administrative law judge, the Workers' Compensation Commission, or courts of this state contrary to or in conflict with any
provision in this act. In the future, if such things as the statute
of limitations, the standard of review by the Workers' Compensation Commission or courts, the extent to which any physical
condition, injury or disease should be excluded from or added
to coverage by the law, or the scope of the workers' compensation statutes need to be liberalized, broadened, or narrowed, it
shall be addressed by the General Assembly and should not be
done by administrative law judges, the Workers' Compensation
Commission, or the courts.2 1
The General Assembly contracted benefits in several ways. First,
it adopted an explicit policy of strict construction of the Workers'
Compensation Act.22 Second, it limited the statutory definition of
"compensable injury" in a dramatic fashion, effectively contracting
benefit eligibility. 2 ' The limited concept of "compensable injury" re20

1993

Ark. Acts 796, § 35 (codified at ARK.

CODE ANN.

§§

11-9-1001 (Michie

Supp. 1993)).
21
22

Id.
Id; see infra part II.B.

23

A comparison of the pre-existing definition of "injury" and the previous defini-

tion of "compensable injury" demonstrates the General Assembly's approach. The
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prior version of Aix CODE ANN. § 11-9-102 (Michie 1987) defined the term "injury"
in the following language: "'Injury' means only accidental injury arising out of and in
the course of employment, including occupational diseases as set out in § 11-9601(e), and occupational infections arising out of and in the course of employment[.]" Id.
The Act re-defined "compensable injury" and provided a far more restrictive view
of those injuries subject to compensation under the Act:
(5) (A) "Compensable Injury" means:
(i) An accidental injury causing internal or external physical harm to
the body or accidental injury to prosthetic appliances, including eyeglasses, contact lenses or hearing aids, arising out of and in the course of
employment and which requires medical services or results in disability or
death. An injury is "accidental" only if it is caused by a specific incident
and is identifiable by time and place of occurrence;
(ii) An injury causing internal or external physical harm to the body
and arising out of and in the course of employment if it is not caused by a
specific incident or is not identifiable by time and place of occurrence, if
the injury is:
(a) Caused by rapid repetitive motion. Carpal tunnel syndrome is
specifically categorized as a compensable injury falling within this
definition;
(b) A back injury which is not caused by a specific incident or which
is not identifiable by time and place of occurrence;
(c) Hearing loss which is not caused by a specific incident or which is
not identifiable by time and place of occurrence;
(iii) Mental illness as set out in § 11-9-113;
(iv) Heart, cardiovascular injury, accident, or disease as set out in
§ 11-9-114;
(v) A hernia as set out in § 11-9-523.
(B) "Compensable injury" does not include:
(i) Injury to any active participant in assaults or combats which,
although they may occur in the workplace, are the result of nonemployment-related hostility or animus of one, both, or all of the combatants,
and which said assault or combat amounts to a deviation from customary
duties; further, except for innocent victims, injuries caused by horseplay
shall not be considered to be compensable injuries;
(ii) Injury incurred while engaging in or performing, or as the result
of engaging in or performing, any recreational or social activities for the
employee's personal pleasure;
(iii) Injury which was inflicted upon the employee at a time when
employment services were not being performed, or before the employee
was hired or after the employment relationship was terminated;
(iv) Injury where the accident was substantially occasioned by the use
of alcohol, illegal drugs or prescription drugs used in contravention of
physician's orders. The presence of alcohol, illegal drugs or prescription
drugs used in contravention of a physician's orders shall create a rebuttable presumption that the injury or accident was substantially occasioned
by the use of alcohol, illegal drugs, or prescription drugs used in contravention of physician's orders. Every employee is deemed by his performance of services to have impliedly consented to reasonable and
responsible testing by properly trained medical or law enforcement per-
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stricts recovery in a number of significant ways. The primary limitation
requires a showing of a direct nexus between the claimant's work-related activities and the injury.2 4 The existence of a pre-existing injury
or condition, whether as a result of a later injury or the natural aging
process, 25 thus, will defeat a claim for compensation; unless the comsonnel for the presence of any of the aforementioned substances in the
employees body. An employee shall not be entitled to compensation unless it is proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the alcohol, illegal drugs or prescription drugs utilized in contravention of the physicians
orders did not substantially occasion the injury or accident.
(C) The definition of "compensable injury" as set forth hereinabove
shall not be deemed to limit or abrogate the right to recover for mental
injuries as set forth in § 11-9-113 or occupational diseases as hereinafter
set forth in § 11-9-601 et seq.
(D) A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence,
supported by "objective findings" as defined in § 11-9-102(16).
(E) BURDEN OF PROOF. The burden of proof of a compensable injury
shall be on the employee and shall be as follows:
(i) For injuries falling within the definition of compensable injury
under subdivision 5(A) (i) of this section, the burden of proof shall be a
preponderance of the evidence;
(ii) For injuries falling within the definition of compensable injury
under subdivision 5(A) (ii) of this section, the burden of proof shall be by
a preponderance of the evidence, and the resultant condition is compensable only if the alleged compensable injury is the major cause of the disability or need for treatment.
(F) BENEFITM.
(i) When an employee is determined to have a compensable injury,
the employee is entitled to medical and temporary disability as provided
this chapter.
(ii) Permanent benefits shall be awarded only upon a determination
that the compensable injury was the major cause of the disability or impairment. If any compensable injury combines with a pre-existing disease
or condition or the natural process of aging to cause or prolong disability
or a need for treatment, permanent benefits shall be payable for the resultant condition only if the compensable injury is the major cause of the
permanent disability or need for treatment.
(iii) Under subdivision (5) (F) of this section, benefits shall not be
payable for a condition which results from a nonwork-related independent intervening cause following a compensable injury which causes or prolongs disability or a need for treatment. A nonwork-related independent
intervening cause does not require negligence or recklessness on the part
of a claimant.
(iv) Nothing in this section shall limit the payment of rehabilitation
benefits or benefits for disfigurement as set forth in this chapter[.]
1993 Ark. Acts 796, § 2 (codified at ARm. CODE ANN. § 11-9-102(5) (Michie Supp.
1993)).
24 Id.
25 Not only did the General Assembly expressly seek to disallow claims resulting
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plainant can demonstrate that the work-related injury was the major
cause of the impairment.2 6 Moreover, unless the worker can point to
a specific cause, injuries sustained as a result of work-related activities
are not compensable2 7 unless they fit within statutory exceptions. The
statutory exceptions include: carpal tunnel syndrome and related injuries, back injuries, hearing loss, limited mental illness suffered concurrently with physical injury, certain incidents of heart attack or
28
cardiovascular disease and hernias.

The General Assembly also struck at the perceived crisis in workfrom or aggravated by natural aging process, it expressly directed compliance with
this provision by overruling prior case law on point in the following language: "The
purpose and intent of this section is to annul any and all case law inconsistent herewith, including International Paper Co. v. Tuberville, 302 Ark. 22, 786 S.W.2d 830
(1990)." 1993 Ark. Acts 796, § 31 (codified at Aa. CODE ANN. § 11-9-713(e) (Michie
Supp. 1993)). Such direct reference to a judicial decision in the statute has the advantage of clearly indicating that the General Assembly did not contemplate reconciliation of prior decisions with the amended Act.
26 1993 Ark. Acts 796, § 2 (codified at ARx CODE ANN. § 11-9-102 (5) (E) (ii)
(Michie Supp. 1993)).
27 The Act provides, in pertinent part: "An injury is 'accidental' only if it is caused
by a specific incident and is identifiable by time and place of occurrence[.]" 1993 Ark.
Acts 796, § 2 (codified at Asu. CODE ANN. § 11-9-102(5)(A)(i) (Michie Supp. 1993)).
At least one observer has noted that the exclusion of many injuries from the ambit of
"compensable injuries" recognized under the amended Act may open the door to
negligence claims directed at employers seeking redress for work-related, but noncompensable injuries. Richard E. Holiman, A Different Viewpoint: Civil Litigation Reforms of the New Worker's Compensation Act, ApIx LAw., Summer 1993, at 23.
28 1993 Ark. Acts 796, § 2 (codified at Asx. CODE ANN. § 11-9-102(5) (A) (ii) to (v)
(Michie Supp. 1993)). The specific recognition of mental illness as a compensable
injury is controlled by newly adopted language which provides:
(a) (1)A mental injury or illness is not a compensable injury unless it
is caused by physical injury to the employee's body, and shall not be considered an injury arising out of and in the course of employment or compensable unless it is demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence;
provided, however, that this physical injury limitation shall not apply to
any victim of a crime of violence.
(2) No mental injury or illness under this section shall be compensable unless it is also diagnosed by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist and unless the diagnosis of the condition meets the criteria
established in the most current issue of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.
(b) (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, where a
claim is by reason of mental injury or illness, the employee shall be limited
to twenty-six (26) weeks of disability benefits.
(2) (A) In case death results directly from the mental injury or illness
within a period of one (1) year, compensation shall be paid the dependents as provided in other death cases under this chapter.
(B) Death directly or indirectly related to the mental injury or ill-
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ers' compensation by increasing enforcement of anti-fraud provisions
in the law. These provisions included increasing penalties for employees' and employers' fraudulent conduct and creating a fraud investi29

gation unit.

In addition, the General Assembly sought to address the problem
of rising premiums attributable to increasing medical expenses3 0 in
two specific ways. First, it created the Workers' Health and Safety Division. This Division is responsible for assessing causes of injuries and
occupational disease, and instituting educational programs to educate
ness occurring one (1) year or more from the incident resulting in the
mental injury or illness shall not be a compensable injury.
1993 Ark. Acts 796, § 8 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-113 (Michie Supp. 1993)).
Recovery for coronary disease or incident is limited, as provided in the Act, as
amended:
(a) A cardiovascular, coronary, pulmonary, respiratory, or cerebrovascular accident or myocardial infarction causing injury, illness, or
death is a compensable injury only if, in relation to other factors contributing to the physical harm, an accident is the major cause of the physical
harm.
(b) (1) An injury or disease included in subsection (a) of this section
shall not be deemed to be a compensable injury unless it is shown that the
exertion of the work necessary to precipitate the disability or death was
extraordinary and unusual in comparison to the employee's usual work in
the course of the employee's regular employment or, alternately, that
some unusual and unpredicted incident occurred which is found to have
been the major cause of the physical harm.
(2) Stress, physical or mental, shall not be considered in determining whether the employee or claimant has met his burden of proof.
1993 Ark. Acts 796, § 8 (codified at AwL CODE ANN. § 11-9-114 (Michie Supp. 1993)).
29 1993 Ark. Acts 796, § 5 (codified at ARr CODE ANN. § 11-9-106(d) (1) (A)
(Michie Supp. 1993)). Under the previous version of the statute, a person who knowingly and willfully made a false statement or misrepresentation would be guilty of a
misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment not to exceed one year or a fine of not
more than $300. AiaL CODE ANN. § 11-9-106(a) (Michie 1987). The amended version reclassified the crime as a class D felony. 1993 Ark. Acts 796, § 5 (codified at Aiu.
CODE ANN. § 11-9-106(a)(1) (Michie Supp. 1993)). A Class D Felony carries a sentence not to exceed six years and a fine of not more than $10,000. Aiuc CODE ANN.
§ 5-4-201 (a) (2), -401(a) (5) (Michie 1993).
30 In 1990, Arkansas ranked nationally as the fifth worst state in compensation
costs as carriers paid $1.42 in benefits for every $1.00 in premiums collected. John D.
Copeland, The New Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act: Did the Pendulum Swing Too
Far?,47 ARrx L. Rv. 1, 3 (1994). Copeland notes that as the average medical cost per
compensation claim increased from $1137 to $1582 over a three year period from
1988 to 1991, the percentage of claims paid under the existing compensation scheme
attributable to medical costs also increased from 47.35% to 52.3%. Id. at 3, n.3 (citing
Carol Griffee, A Workmen's Compensation Compromise, Aiu. Bus., May 25, 1992, at 16).
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employers in worker safety. 31 Second, the General Assembly took a
drastic step in mandating a "managed health care" system that requires treatment by physicians and care facilities associated with a
managed health care entity.3 2 The key provision is the setting of rea31 1993 Ark. Acts 796, § 13 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-409 (Michie Supp.
1993)).
32 Id. § 19 (codified at ARK CODE ANN. § 11-9-508 (Michie Supp. 1993)). New
subsection (c) specifically provides for creation of the managed care system, with subsection (d) delineating the parameters of the system and rights of the injured
employee:
(c) In order to help control the cost of medical benefits, the commission.., is authorized and directed to establish appropriate rules and regulations to establish and implement a system of managed health care for
the State of Arkansas.
(d) For the purpose of establishing and implementing a system of
managed health care, the commission is authorized to:
(1) Develop rules and regulations for the certification of managed
care entities to provide managed care to injured workers;
(2) Develop regulations for peer review, service utilization, and resolution of medical disputes;
(3) Prohibit "balanced billing" from the employee, employer, or
carrier;
(4) Establish fees for medical services as provided for in Rule 30 and
its amendments. The commission shall make no distinction in approving
fees from different classes of medical service providers or health care providers for provision of the same or essentially similar medical services or
health care services as defined herein; and
(5) (A) Give the employer the right to choose the initial treating physician, with the injured employee having the right to petition the
commission for a one-time only change of physician to one who is
associated with a managed care entity certified by the commission, or
is the regular treating physician of the employee who maintains the
employees medical records and with whom the employee has a bona
fide doctor-patient relationship demonstrated by a history of regular
treatment prior to the onset of the compensable injury, but only if
the primary care physician agrees to refer the employee to a certified
managed care entity for any specialized treatment, including physical
therapy, -and only if such primary care physician agrees to comply
with all the rules, terms, and conditions regarding services performed
by the managed care entity initially chosen by the employer.
(B) A petition for change shall be expedited by the commission.
(e) Any section or subsection of this act notwithstanding, the injured
employee shall have direct access to any optometric or ophthalmologic
medical service provider who agrees to provide services under the rules,
terms, and conditions regarding services performed by the managed care
entity initially chosen by the employer for the treatment and management
of eye injuries or conditions. Such optometric or ophthalmologic medical
service provider shall be considered a certified provider by the
commission.

1994]

WORKERS' COMPENSATION REFORM

593

sonable fees for the treatment of work-related injuries."3 Finally, the
General Assembly expanded the group of employees eligible for protection under the Act to include those employees of general contractors against whom recovery for work-related injuries is now limited by
the Act's exclusivity doctrine.3 4
One of the General Assembly's primary objectives in restructuring the system was to ensure inflexibility, rather than flexibility, when
evaluating the rights of injured employees. In achieving this objective
the General Assembly was "successful in swinging the workers' compensation legal pendulum from a liberally construed act which was
sympathetic to workers' claims and sometimes produced absurd re3
sults to a strict, unbending act which is management oriented."
B.

The Demandfor Strict Construction of the Revised Law

The General Assembly sought to deal with the perceived problem of expansive interpretation of the compensation statute by limiting the discretion of the state's courts and the administrative
system. This legislative foray into the judicial administration of the
Act creates a separation of powers problem to be discussed infra.
The Assembly directed the Workers' Compensation Commission,
in its administration of the workers' compensation scheme, to confine interpretation to a strict reading of the language of the Act, as
amended.3 6 Apparently, this strict construction approach was
(f) The commission is authorized to promulgate any other rules or
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this section
and its purpose of controlling medical costs through the establishment of
a managed care system.
Id. (codified at § 11-9-508 (c) to (f)).
33 1993 Ark. Acts 796, § 19 (codified at Apm CODE ANN. § 11-9-508(d) (4) (Michie
Supp. 1993)) (establishing uniform fees for medical services).
34 The Act sets forth the exclusivity doctrine and provides, in pertinent part:
(a) The rights and remedies granted to an employee subject to the provisions of this chapter, on account of injury or death, shall be exclusive of all
other rights and remedies of the employee, his legal representative, dependents, next of kin, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages
from the employer, or any principal, officer, director, stockholder, or partner acting in his capacity as an employer, orprime contractorof the employer,
on account of the injury or death, and the negligent acts of a coemployee
shall not be imputed to the employer. ...
Id. § 4 (emphasis added) (codified at ARi. CODE ANN. § 11-9-105(a) (Michie Supp.
1993)).
35 Pesek et al., supra note 2, at 21.
36 For example, the General Assembly expressly stated its policy was to annul prior
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designed to reverse and supplant the traditional liberal construction of workers' compensation laws afforded to claimants.3 7 The
traditional approach almost necessarily results in expansion of eligibility and benefits because close questions are resolved in favor of
coverage and compensation. 8
C.

Annulment of the Civil Remedy for Wrongful Discharge

The General Assembly sought to annul decisions of the Arkansas Supreme Court 39 that afforded an employee a civil remedy for
an employer's discrimination or retaliatory discharge of that employee prompted by the employee's assertion of rights under the
Workers' Compensation Act.4" The recognition of this remedy
judicial decisions. 1993 Ark. Acts 796, § 1 (not codified). Another subsection provides "[t]he purpose of this section is to provide for a timely hearing on claims for
benefits" and "the annulment of any and all case law inconsistent herewith." Id. § 27
(codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-702 (h) (Michie Supp. 1993)).
37 See, e.g., Holiday Inn-West v. Coleman, 792 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990)
(holding that both the Workers' Compensation Commission and the state courts are
required to construe the Act liberally to give effect to its remedial purpose). Other
jurisdictions have traditionally applied the rule of affording compensation claimants
the benefit of a liberal construction of the compensation act. See, e.g., B & B Nursing
Home v. Blair, 496 P.2d 795, 798 (Okla. 1972); Walters v. American States Ins. Co.,
654 S.W.2d 423, 430 (Tex. 1983) (McGee, J., concurring) (citing Huffman v. Southern Underwriters, 128 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1939)).
38 For instance, in redefining the critical term "compensable injury," the General
Assembly specifically sought to annul prior commission and judicial decisions on
point by providing that "[a]ny and all prior decisions by the Commission and the
Courts inconsistent with the definition of compensable injury as herein set forth are
hereby specifically annulled, repealed, and held for naught." 1993 Ark. Acts 796, § 2
(not codified) (This provision also appeared in the Act signed by the Governor of
Arkansas but does not appear in the Michie Supplement. See infra note 3.).
39 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Baysinger, 812 S.W.2d 463 (Ark. 1991); Mapco,
Inc. v. Payne, 812 S.W.2d 483 (Ark. 1991).
40 The evolution of an employee's retaliatory discharge remedy for filing a workers' compensation claim is chronicled in Jean C. Love, Retaliatoy Dischargefor Filinga
Workers' Compensation Claim: The Development of a Modem Tort Action, 37 HASTiNGS LJ.
551 (1986). Other jurisdictions have also recognized a cause of action for retaliatory
discharge. See, e.g., Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:191 to -8 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d
505 (NJ. 1980) (creating a common law cause of action for public policy discharge).
The development of a remedy for this type of employer discrimination in Arkansas
had been predicted in Mark L. Martin, Comment, WrongFul Discharge of Employees Terminable at Will-A New Theory of Liability in Arkansas, 34 Apxc L. REv. 729 (1981).
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followed legislative 4' and judicial42 recognition of similar remedies
in other jurisdictions45for retaliation directed toward workers' compensation claimants.
Although the Act long had included a criminal penalty provision for offending employers,4 4 the absence of any annotations to
this provision in the official statutes does not necessarily indicate
that such discrimination did not exist in Arkansas.4 5 Presuming no
employer discrimination occurred does not account for the legislative expansion of the criminal penalty to include prosecution as a
felony and adding an administrative remedy. More likely, it suggests that employers effectively were insulated from prosecution for
such discrimination.4 6 The Act increased the range of punishment
41 See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a (West Supp. 1994), construed in Portillo v. G.T.
Price Prod., Inc., 131 Cal. App. 3d 285 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85,
§§ 5-7 (1992), construed in Thompson v. Medley Material Handling, Inc., 732 P.2d 461
(Okla. 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.410 (1993), construed in Delaney v. Taco Time,
Int'l, Inc., 681 P.2d 114 (Or. 1984); TEX. REv. CyV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c, § I (West
Supp. 1987), construed in Carnation Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450, 451 (Tex. 1980).
42 See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E,2d 353 (Ill. 1978); Puchert v. Agsalud,
677 P.2d 449 (Haw. 1984), appeal dismissed sub nom., Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v.
Puchert, 472 U.S. 1001 (1985); Firestone Textile Co. Div. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730
(Ky. 1983); Hansen v. Harrah's, 675 P.2d 394 (Nev. 1984); Smith v. Mallory Timers
Co., 97 A.D.2d 571 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983), rev'd, 63 N.Y.2d 1002 (N.Y. 1984); Clanton v.
Cain-Sloan Co. 677 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1984).
43 For a comprehensive national survey of the development of the wrongful discharge remedy in tort, see Love, supra note 40. In contrast to the trend in other
jurisdictions to base such claims upon tort principles, the Arkansas Supreme Court in
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380 (Ark. 1988), predicated its wrongful
discharge action on breach of implied contract.
44 ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-107 (Michie 1987) provided:
Any employer who willfully discriminates in regard to the hiring or
tenure of work or any term or condition of work of any individual on
account of his claiming benefits under this chapter or who in any manner
obstructs or impedes the filing of claims for benefits under this chapter
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction shall be punished by a
fine of not to exceed one hundred ($100) dollars, or by imprisonment of
not to exceed six (6) months, or by both fine and imprisonment.
Id.
45 Id.
46 In

addition, the amended Act provides for increased penalties for employers or
claimants who falsify claims or defenses in an effort to qualify for or defeat a claim for
compensation, or to increase or decrease benefit levels. Under the prior statute, only
an employee was subject to prosecution for falsification, but the penalty range included only incarceration for up to one year and fine of up to $300. ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 11-9-106 (Michie 1987). The amended section increases potential liability for any
party engaging in misrepresentation to the Class D felony level. 1993 Ark. Acts 796,
§ 5 (codified at ARx. CODE ANN. § 11-9-106(a) (1) (Michie Supp. 1993)). Interest-
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from misdemeanor to felony grade and included the potential administrative sanction of a fine of up to $10,000 for employer discrimination or discharge based on retaliation.4 7
More significantly, the Act expressly provided for exclusivity of
these remedies.4 8 This exclusivity furthers the goal of preserving
the at-will employment doctrine by annulling the public policy
wrongful discharge remedy that had been evolving in decisions of
the Arkansas Supreme Court.4 9 In SterlingDrug, Inc. v. Oxford,5" the
court initially recognized a civil remedy for whistle-blowers disingly, the new Act expressly extends felony liability for conspiracy to engage in misrepresentation to include prosecution for a Class D felony as well. Id. § 5 (codified at
Ai. CODE ANN. § 11-9-106 (a)(2) (Michie Supp. 1993)).
47 The revised statute provides, in pertinent part:
(a) (1) Any employer who willfully discriminates in regard to the hiring or tenure of work or any term or condition of work of any individual
on account of the individual's claim for benefits under this chapter, or
who in any manner obstructs or impedes the filing of claims for benefits
under this chapter, shall be subject to a fine of up to ten thousand dollars
($10,000) as determined by the Workers' Compensation Commission.
(2) This fine shall be payable to the [Workers' Compensation Commission] Second Injury Trust Fund and paid by the employer and not by
the carrier.
(b) In addition, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover costs
and a reasonable attorney's fee payable from the fine; provided, however,
if the employee is the nonprevailing party, the attorney's fee and costs
shall, at the election of the employer, be paid by the employee or deducted from future workers' compensation benefits.
(c) The employer may also be guilty of a Class D felony....
1993 Ark. Acts 796, § 6 (codified at Ai. CODE ANN. § 11-9-107 (Michie Supp. 1993)).
48 Id. § 4 (codified at Aim. CODE ANN. § 11-9-105(a) (Michie Supp. 1993)).
49 The amended version of the Act provides for criminal and administrative liability for retaliatory discharge, and also clearly expresses the General Assembly's purpose
in restraining judicial recognition of exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine.
The pertinent portion reads:
(d) This section shall not be construed as establishing an exception
to the employment at will doctrine.
(e) A purpose of this section is to preserve the exclusive remedy doctrine and specifically annul any case law inconsistent herewith, including
but not necessarily limited to: Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Baysinger, 306 Ark.
239, 812 S.W.2d 463 (1991); Mapco, Inc. v. Payne, 306 Ark. 198, 812
S.W.2d 483 (1991); and Thomas v. Valmac Industries, Inc., 306 Ark. 228,
812 S.W.2d 673 (1991).
1993 Ark. Acts 796, § 6 (codified at Aim CODE ANN. § 11-9-107 (d), (e) (Michie Supp.
1993)); see infra notes 55 to 64 and accompanying text.
50 743 S.W.2d 380 (Ark. 1988). See Sarah Lewis, Note, Labor-Employment at WillPublic Policy Exception Recognize& Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 743
S.W2d 380 (1988), 11 U. ARi. Lr-rt. ROCK L.J. 617 (1988-89) (analyzing the Sterling
Drug decision); Jay T. Youngdahl, The Erosion of Employment-At-Will Doctrine in Arkansas,
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charged as a result of disclosing their employer's illegal acts. 5
While not directly applying the remedy to compensation claimants,
the court impliedly accepted this form of discrimination as falling
within the public policy concerns of the remedy.5 2 Citing the
53
landmark Indiana decision of Frampton v. CentralIndiana Gas Co.,
the Sterling Drugcourt supported the development of wrongful discharge exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine.5 4
The court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Baysinge 5 and Mapco, Inc.
v. Payne5 6 extended SterlingDrug to afford protection to discharged
compensation claimants. The Sterling Drug remedy failed to adequately provide a basis for recovery because it was grounded in a
theory of implied contract, 57 rather than tort. Thus, it limited the
discharged claimant's recovery potential to contractual damages
for lost wages and benefits.5" However, the latter two decisions nev40 Aiu. L. REv. 545 (1987) (noting trend undermining the doctrine in Arkansas decisions and foreshadowing the state supreme court's holding).
51 743 S.W.2d at 385. Other states have legislated protection for employees who
"blow the whistle" on their employers. See, e.g., Conscientious Employee Protection
Act, NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:19-1 to -8 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (NJ. 1980) (creating a common law cause of action
for public policy discharge). See also Michael K. Furey et al., Overview: More
Whistleblowers", 136 N.J.L.J. 1384 (Apr. 11, 1994) (reviewing judicial awards in Michigan, Texas and New Jersey pursuant to statutory whistleblower protection acts).
52 The court stated that "we acknowledge that an employer should not have an
absolute and unfettered right to terminate an employee for an act done for the good
of the public." 743 S.W.2d at 385.
53 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973), cited in Sterling Drug, 743 S.W.2d at 384.
54 The Sterling Drug court concluded that in determining the parameters of the
public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine, the state's public policy
could be discerned from its constitution and statutes. 743 S.W.2d at 385 (citing Kirksey v. City of Fort Smith, 300 S.W.2d 257 (Ark. 1957) (state's "public policy" embodied
in its "constitution and statutes")). Thus, the criminal penalties for wrongful discharge of compensation claimants included in the prior version of ARu. CODE ANN.
§ 11-9-107 (Michie 1987) provided the state supreme court an accurate statement of
Arkansas public policy upon which a civil action for retaliatory discharge could ultimately be predicated.
55 812 S.W.2d 463 (Ark. 1991).
56 812 S.W.2d 483 (Ark. 1991).
57 743 S.W.2d at 385 (following Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834
(Wis. 1983)).
58 Id. at 386-87. This approach was criticized by dissenting Justice Purtle, who observed, "The conduct by the employer in this case caused the appellee embarrassment, humiliation, physical and mental problems, and severe financial losses. None
of these elements of damages are recoverable under the majority decision." Id. at 388
(Purtle, J. dissenting). Justice Purtle continued his scathing attack on the majority
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ertheless represented an important breakthrough in the protection
of compensation claimants from employer retaliation.
In response, the General Assembly expressly "annulled"5 9 the
decisions in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Baysingei" and Mapco, Inc. v.
Payne.6 ' It did so to enhance the criminal punishment available. 6 2
The General Assembly hoped to discourage employer retaliation
by creating the new administrative remedy of providing fines for
offending employers.6" Neither remedy provided direct recovery
by the discharged claimant, however, nor for reinstatement. Moreover, the provision included no incentives for claimants' counsel to
pursue these remedies on behalf of their clients, such as those generally available in civil actions in contingent fee arrangements or
recovery of reasonable attorney's fees by statute.6 4
1X. A Tradition of Separation of Powers Conflicts
On a purely local level, the General Assembly's action may evidence on-going jealousy within the Arkansas tri-partite system of
government between the proper roles accorded the legislative and
judicial branches in administering the justice system.6 5 On the
large scale, however, concerns are focused on the breadth of this
fight, involving the future roles of the traditionally "independent"
judicial branch and the traditionally "influenced" legislative
opinion in his dissent from the per curiarn order denying rehearing. Sterling Drug,
Inc. v. Oxford, 747 S.W.2d 579, 579-80 (Ark. 1988) (Purtle, J. dissenting).
59 1993 Ark. Acts 796, § 6 (codified at ARx. CODE ANN. § 11-9-107 (e) (Michie
Supp. 1993)).
60 812 S.W.2d 463 (Ark. 1991).
61 812 S.W.2d 483 (Ark. 1991).
62 1993 Ark. Acts 796, § 5 (codified at ARsx CODE ANN. § 11-9-106 (Michie Supp.
1993)).
63 Id.
64 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-308 (Michie 1994) (governing attorney's fees in civil
actions).
65 One Arkansas commentator, reflecting on the legislative goals in adopting Act
796, observed:
Although Section 35 [, the provision directing the state's courts not to
"liberalize" application of the act, as amended,] has no teeth due to a doctrine call[ed] "Separation of Powers," it is clear that the drafters were sending the message to all that they will not tolerate anyone trying to
accomplish workers' compensation "reform" without their involvement.
In other words, if the ALJs, Commission or courts expand the provisions
of the new Act, you can count on the General Assembly to correct the
expansion at the next legislative session.
Pesek et al., supra note 2, at 24.
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branch in forming important aspects of public policy bearing upon
individual rights.
Observers of recent policy developments in Arkansas are not
shocked at the criticism leveled at the state's judicial system by the
General Assembly in its reform of the workers' compensation
scheme. The most obvious example of this tension involves the
competing efforts of the General Assembly and the judiciary to create a comprehensive law of evidence for use in Arkansas courts. 66
In 1976, the General Assembly enacted legislation adopting a
set of rules of evidence for use in the state's court system.67 The
statutory provisions setting forth the rules essentially mirrored the
federal rules of evidence 68 in all significant respects, 69 although
66 CompareARK.R. EVID. 101 to 1102 (legislatively adopted rules) (Aic. CODE ANN.
§ 16-41-101 (Michie 1994)) with A.R.E. RuLE 101 to 1102 (judicially adopted rules).
67 ARK.CODE ANN. § 16-41-101 (Michie 1994) (The "Uniform Rules of Evidence"
were adopted by the General Assembly in 1975 Ark. Acts 1143, § 1 (Extended Sess.
1976)).
68 The "Uniform Rules" follow the same division of evidentiary concepts by articles
and utilize the same numerical framework for designation of particular rules employed in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Compare AiYx R. EvID. 101 to 1102 (ARI&
CODE ANN. § 16-41-101 (Michie 1994)) with FED. R. EvID. 101 to 1103.
69 This is not to suggest that the General Assembly's "Uniform Rules" did not diverge from the Federal Rules in any respect. For example, AiK. R. EvID. 803(8), defining public documents admissible as exceptions to the general hearsay prohibition,
differs markedly from the federal rule in terms of language.
Substantive differences, though few, also exist between the Arkansas and federal
rules. An important distinction is found in FED. R. EvID. 704(b), which precludes an
expert from rendering an opinion on the mental state of a criminal defendant at the
time of commission of an offense. No such prohibition limiting an expert's opinion
on this question of ultimate fact is included in the Arkansas version. Amc R.EVID.
704. In fact, ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-303 (Michie 1993) expressly authorizes admission
of expert opinion on mental state in a criminal trial when relevant to a defensive issue
as to criminal intent. Robinson v. State, 598 S.W.2d 421 (Ark. 1980) (holding the
statute applies to allow expert opinion on the ultimate issue of fact concerning the
defendant's mental state at the time of the crime).
Moreover, FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3) permits the admission of an accomplice's
jointly inculpatory statement against the accused in a criminal trial, provided certain
guarantees of trustworthiness and reliability are met. See State v. Earnest, 703 P.2d
872 (N.M. 1985), vacated, 477 U.S. 648 (1986) (holding no constitutional prohibition
on admission of non-testifying accomplice's jointly inculpatory confession under comparable New Mexico rule governing admission of declarations against penal interest
provided statement contained sufficient indicia of trustworthiness and reliability).
The comparable Arkansas provision addressing the penal interest exception expressly
precludes such statements: "A statement or confession offered against the accused in
a criminal case, made by a codefendant or other person implicating both himself and
the accused, is not within this exception." AmK. R. EvID. 804(b) (3) (ARK.CODE ANN.
§ 16-41-101 (Michie 1994)). The admissibility of the codefendant's confession in a
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other provisions not included in this enactment also addressed evidentiary matters.7" The state supreme court declared the evidence
code invalid based upon a procedural defect in the legislative
7
process. '
Subsequently, the Arkansas Supreme Court adopted its own
Rules of Evidence for use in state court proceedings.7 2 These rules
also mirrored the Federal Rules of Evidence.7 3 These court-made
federal prosecution is again being addressed by the United States Supreme Court this
term in Wiliamson v. United States. 981 F.2d 1262 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 114 S.
Ct. 681 (U.S.Jan. 10, 1994) (No. 93-5256).
70 For example, the General Assembly also recognized the need to dispense with
pro forma testimony relating to the predicate for admission of medical records. This
action was to ease the burden placed upon medical offices and hospitals to make their
staff charged with record keeping available for live testimony at trials. Under Arkansas law, deposition testimony may not generally be substituted for live testimony at
trial unless circumstances preclude the witness from appearing. Amj. R. Civ. P. 32
(providing for exceptions to the live witness rule where the witness has died or is
beyond the reach of the court's subpoena power, but not expressly providing for admission of deposition testimony upon agreement of the parties). The General Assembly addressed the problem by recognizing a procedural exception to the general rule
for admission of medical records evidence and creating a standardized affidavit for
use in admission of these records. Hospital Records Act, AMc CODE ANN. §§ 16-46301 to -308 (Michie 1994).
Similarly, the General Assembly enacted a "rape shield law" designed to protect
complainants in criminal prosecution from disclosure of prior sexual history unless
this evidence has been found to be relevant to an issue in the instant prosecution
after notice and hearing before the trial court, conducted in camera, prior to trial.
Apt. CODE ANN. § 16-42-101 (Michie 1994). The Arkansas Supreme Court in Flurry v.
State, 720 S.W.2d 699 (Ark. 1986) upheld this limitation on use of evidence for impeachment purposes in criminal prosecutions.
71 In Ricarte v. State, 717 S.W.2d 488, 489 (Ark. 1986), the Arkansas Supreme
Court held that the "Uniform Rules of Evidence" were invalid, having been adopted
during an unlawful session of the General Assembly.
72 The supreme court's per curiam order accompanying its opinion in Ricarte
provided:
As explained in today's opinion in Ricarte v. State, 290 Ark. 100, 717 S.W.2d
488 (Oct. 13, 1986), the court under its statutory and rule-making authority adopts the Uniform Rules of Evidence as they are set forth in Act 1143
of 1975 (Extended Session, 1976). The Rules will be applicable as stated
in Rule 1101. Rule 1102 is changed to read: "These rules shall be known
as the Arkansas Rules of Evidence and may be cited as A.R.E. Rule -. "
In re Adoption of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 717 S.W.2d 491 (Ark. 1986). For
purposes of this article, the court-made rules of evidence will be cited as A.R.E. RuLE
-,
and the legislative rules of evidence will be cited Apic R. EVID. -.
73 The Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted by the United States Supreme
Court by an order dated November 20, 1972. See Reporter's Note, 409 U.S. 1132
(1973). Subsequently, Congress acted to limit the application of the Court's order
until such time as it had acted to approve the rules. Id. Justice Douglas dissented
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rules are generally deemed authoritative by the court in
litigation.74
In apparent response to the supreme court's action, the General Assembly re-enacted its evidence code, this time in compliance
with procedural requirements for the introduction of legislation.75
Consequently, Arkansas law now includes both ajudicially-adopted
set of evidentiary rules, 76 and a legislatively-enacted evidence
"code."" The latter is destined to be ignored in the official decisions of the state's appellate courts despite the "code ['s]" provision
that the Uniform Rules govern admission of evidence in the state's
courts.78

The existence of two sets of "official" rules does not indicate a
mere technical oversight on the part of the judicial and legislative
branches in terms of duplication of effort. Rather, it indicates a
from the order, arguing that the evidence rules should be the product of either caseby-case development or Congressional legislation. Id. (Douglas, J. dissenting).
74 A.R.E. RULE 1101 provides:

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (b), these rules apply to
all actions and proceedings in the [courts of this state].
(b) Rules Inapplicable. The rules other than those with respect to privileges do not apply in the following situations:
(1) Preliminary questions of fact. The determination of questions of fact
preliminary to admissibility of evidence when the issue is to be determined
by the court under Rule 104 (a).
(2) Grand jury. Proceedings before grand juries.
(3) Miscellaneous proceedings. Proceedings for extradition or rendition;
[preliminary examination] detention hearing in criminal cases; sentencing, or granting or revoking probation; issuance of warrants for arrest,
criminal summonses, and search warrants; and proceedings with respect
to release on bail or otherwise.
(4) Contempt proceedings in which the court may act summarily.
A.R.E. RULE 1101.
75 1987 Ark. Acts 876 (codified at Aiuc CODE ANN. § 16-41-101 (Michie 1994)).
76 A.R.E. RULES 101 to 1102.
77 Uniform Rules of Evidence, ARK. R. EVID. 101 to 1102 (Ai. CODE ANN. § 16-41101 (Michie 1994)). Otherjurisdictions operate under an "evidence code" approach
in which the state legislature adopts the rules of evidence. See, e.g., CAL. R. EviD. 1 to
1605; LA. R. EvID. 101 to 1103; N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 4501-46 (Consol. 1994); N.J. R.
Evid. 1 to 72, in RIcHARD J. BIUNNO, CURRENT N.J. RULES OF EVIDENCE at iv (1992)
(("The Rules of Evidence represent the product of the cooperative effort of the Legislature and the Supreme Court.") (New Jersey's prior evidence code which is no
longer in effect)); N.J. R. EVID. 101 to 1103 (New Jersey's current evidence code
which is currently in effect).
78 ARK. R. EViD. 1101 (Aiuc. CODE ANN. § 16-41-101 (Michie 1994)). Rule 1101
provides: "Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (b), these rules apply to all
actions and proceedings in the courts of this state." Id.
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true conflict in philosophy respecting the propriety ofjudicial control over the litigation process.79 This conflict has appeared in at
least two different circumstances in recent years when conflicts
over specific control of the process developed.
In State v. Sypult,8 the state supreme court considered enforcing a legislative provision that excluded communications relating
to child abuse from any privilege recognized in the "Uniform Rules
of Evidence" other than the attorney/client or minister/confessor
privilege."' The accused made statements to physicians and a
counselor at the Veterans Administration Hospital that the state
sought to use at trial."2 Prior to trial, defense counsel moved to
suppress the statements on the ground that they were protected by
79 For a discussion of the propriety ofjudicial rulemaking in the context of matters
of evidence, see Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 551 P.2d 1354 (N.M.
1976). NewJersey faces a similar separation of powers problem. NewJersey's constitution authorizes the court to make rules "governing the administration of all courts
in the state and, subject to law, the practice and procedure in all such courts." N.J.
CONST. art. VI, § II, para. 3. The NewJersey Constitution divides rulemaking authority between the Legislature, for substantive issues, and the Supreme Court, for procedural issues pertaining to the court. However, in Winberry v. Salisbury, 74 A.2d 406
(N.J. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950), the NewJersey Supreme Court declared
its self-authority to promulgate court rules beyond legislative review. Although the
state bar made several attempts to challenge this authority, the New Jersey Supreme
Court has yet to curtail its self-proscribed authority. See, e.g., American Trial Lawyers
Ass'n v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 330 A.2d 350 (N.J. 1974) (holding that the
Supreme Court had constitutional authority to adopt a contingent fee agreement);
In re LiVolsi, 428 A.2d 1268 (N.J. 1981) (rejecting the New Jersey Bar Association's
argument that mandatory fee arbitration, upon client's request, was
unconstitutional).
80 800 S.W.2d 402 (Ark. 1990).
81 Id. at 403-04 (citing Asu.. CODE ANN. § 12-12-511 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1989)).
The statute in effect at the time of trial in Sypult provided:
Any provision of the Arkansas Uniforn Rules of Evidence notwithstanding, and
except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any privilege between
husband and wife or between any professional person, except the privilege between a lawyer and client, and the privilege between a minister,
including a Christian Science practitioner, and any person confessing to
or being counseled by the minister, including, but not limited to, physicians, counselors, hospitals, clinics, day-care centers, and schools and their
clients shall not constitute grounds for excluding evidence at any proceeding regarding child abuse, sexual abuse, or neglect of a child or the cause thereof
Id. at 403-04 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-511 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1989)) (emphasis added by the court). This same provision was reenacted following the court's
decision in Sypult. See 1991 Ark. Acts 1208, § 13 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12511 (Michie 1993)).
82 Sypult, 800 S.W.2d at 403.
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the physician and psychotherapist/patient privilege.3 The court
noted that the public policy prompting the General Assembly to
exclude confidential communications from the scope of the patient/therapist privilege to further the goal of reporting of child
abuse was substantial. However, it held that this goal focuses not
on punishment of offenders, but on protection of children. 4 The
court essentially concluded, contrary to unequivocal legislative intent, that the interest of children was better served by "continued
encouragement for child abusers to seek rehabilitative
treatment.

8

5

Quite apart from the merits of the prosecution/rehabilitation
goals of public policy, however, the Sypult Court's opinion demonstrates the continuing tension between the legislative and judicial
86
branches over control of the Arkansas courts. In prior decisions
noted in Sypult, the court had observed that it shared its rulemaking authority with the General Assembly and was prepared to
defer to that body in matters of public policy when legislation conflicted with court rules.8 7 However, the majority then refined its
position on power sharing to only defer to the General Assembly
when such conflicts arise "to the extent that the conflicting court
rule's primary purpose and effectiveness are not compromised;
otherwise, our rules remain supreme."" The Sypult Court concluded by holding that the communication between the accused
and his doctors was confidential and subject to the claimed privilege, although the fact that he sought and received treatment
83 Id. (citing ARK. R. EVID. 503 (ARK.CODE ANN. § 16-41-101 (Michie 1987))). The

court's opinion in Sypult refers to the "Uniform Rules of Evidence," the designation
applied by the General Assembly in re-enacting its version of the evidence rules in
1987. The opinion makes no reference to the judicially-adopted Rules of Evidence or
the precise provision subject to review in the decision. Id. at 404 (citing Ricarte v.
State, 717 S.W.2d 488 (Ark. 1986) ("To avoid this conflict, the trial court designed its
ruling to enforce provisions of our child abuse and sexual abuse statutes while preserving the sanctity of private communications between patients and their doctors and
therapists under the Arkansas Uniform Rules of Evidence.")).
84 Id. at 404-05 (citing State v. Andring, 342 N.W.2d 128 (Minn. 1984) (refusing to
enforce a legislative directive that excluded from an applicable privilege confidential
disclosures made concerning child abuse)).
85 Id. at 405.
86 Id. at 404 (citing Curtis v. State, 783 S.W.2d 47 (Ark. 1990); St. Clair v. State, 783
S.W.2d 835 (Ark. 1990)).
87 Id.
88 Id.
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would not be privileged.8 9
The tension between the legislative and judicial branches to
control the litigation process continued after the judicial declaration of supremacy in Sypult. In Vann v. State,9 ° the court considered
admission of hearsay statements made by a child victim of sexual
abuse pursuant to the Uniform Rules of Evidence.9 1 The court reversed, based upon its reading of the Supreme Court's decision in
Idaho v. Wright,9 2 because the evidence rule did not comport with
the minimum standard for reliability required by the Confrontation Clause.9 3 The court concluded that the Arkansas Child Hearsay Statute,9 4 which had produced the hearsay exception as an
addition to the Uniform Rules of Evidence, ran afoul of Wright's
requirement that hearsay admitted without opportunity for crossexamination demonstrate a degree of truthfulness and that crossexamination would be of "marginal utility."95
Apart from the significance of the court's holding in Vann, the
posture in which the decision itself distinguished legislative from
judicial rule-making in the evidence area was significant.9 6 The
89 Id. Admissibility of the fact that Sypult had sought and obtained treatment, as
opposed to the confidential communications themselves, was based on the court's
prior decision in Baker v. State, 637 S.W.2d 522 (Ark. 1982).
90 831 S.W.2d 126 (Ark. 1992).
91 Aitx. R. EviD. 803(25) (ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-41-101 (Michie 1994)). The rule
provided for admitting statements made by children under the age of 10 years who
were sexual abuse victims, either child abuse or incest, upon the trial court's finding
that the statements "possesse[d] a reasonable likelihood of trustworthiness" based
upon factors relating to the maturity of the child, the context in which the statement
was made, the relationship of the child to the alleged perpetrator and other factors
deemed relevant and appropriate to determining trustworthiness. Id. The rule was
initially upheld as constitutional in St. Clair v. State, 783 S.W.2d 835, 836 (Ark. 1990).
The lower court found this exception to the hearsay rule permitted the introduction
of statements made to third persons, which included in Vann the child's mother, a
nurse and the investigating officer. Vann, 831 S.W.2d at 127.
92 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
93 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
94 ARs_ CODE ANN. § 16-41-101 (Michie 1987) (ARK. R. EvD. 803(25)).
95 Vann, 831 S.W.2d at 128 (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990)).
96 For a thorough treatment of the problems posed by Vann, see Gregory C.
Sandefur, Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Child HearsayException in Sexual Abuse Cases-New
Arkansas Supreme Court Rule Conflicts with New General Assembly Rule: Which Controls?
Vann v. State, 309 Ark. 303, 831 S.W2d 126 (1992), 15 U. ARnx Lrrrt RocK L.J. 143
(1992). The author observes: "The decision in Vann also raises the question, once
again, of whether the legislative branch or the judicial branch of the government in
Arkansas has the authority to promulgate evidentiary rules for the courts in this state."
Id. at 170.
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Vann majority struck down the legislatively adopted rule providing
for admission of child victim hearsay statements, yet proceeded to
adopt new rules at the same time. In doing so, the court recognized exceptions that would comport with the Supreme Court's
concerns in Idaho v. Wright. 7
There is no necessary relationship between the apparent longstanding tension between the Arkansas's General Assembly and
Supreme Court with respect to control of litigation through promulgation of rules of evidence for use in state courts and the General Assembly's recent posture toward judicial activism reflected in
the language used in the Act to restructure the state's workers'
compensation system. Nevertheless, the existence of the tension
does perhaps reflect an on-going legislative sensitivity to expansive
court decisions that it regards as unprincipled activism.
IV. Policy Consequences of Legislative andJudicialActivism
The General Assembly's re-structuring of Arkansas workers'
compensation law raises questions about the proper allocation of
responsibility for legal reform between the legislative and judicial
branches. Worker's compensation reform has not been the only
arena in which legislative-judicial sparring has marked the development of Arkansas law, but the recent legislation may indicate the
severity of tensions in the two branches. For instance, in 1968
when the Arkansas Supreme Court abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity,9" the General Assembly responded by simply adding statutory immunity to municipal employees at its next regular
session.99 The tenor of language in the amended compensation
Act indicates far more concern forjudicial activism in the construction of rights accorded the state's workers.
While creating a workers' compensation system has been a
97 In re Addition to Arkansas Rules of Evidence, 309 Ark. 628 (Ark. 1992). Two of
the rules, A.R.E. RULE 803(25) and A.R.E. RULE 804(b)(7), address questions of admissibility of hearsay statements of children in criminal matters. Id. at 628-31. The
other rule, A.R.E. RULE 804(b) (6), relates to admissibility of child hearsay statements
in civil matters. Id. at 629.
98 Parish v. Pitts, 429 S.W.2d 45 (Ark. 1968) (holding grant of immunity to municipal employees "patently unjust"). The court had earlier taken the position that the
doctrine of municipal immunity arising under common law was unfair and urged the
General Assembly to abrogate this rule in Kirksey v. City of Fort Smith, 300 S.W.2d
257 (Ark. 1957).
99 ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-9-301 (Michie 1987).

606

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

[Vol. 18:581

product of legislative action, the General Assembly's "reform" of
Arkansas compensation law reflects an open hostility toward judicial intervention. This demonstrates both the virtues and consequences of an institutionalized checks and balances approach to
development of legal doctrine. 0 0 The Arkansas Supreme Court,
however, has demonstrated a willingness to defer at times to the
General Assembly over creating new causes of action. 10 '
Certainly, the General Assembly was properly charged with the
obligation to create and maintain a viable workers' compensation
system.'
If, in fact, a fiscal crisis did threaten the integrity of the
state's scheme for addressing the industrial injury problem, then
legislative action would be appropriate for investigating the nature
of the crisis, including verifying its actual existence, and consider10 3
ing alternatives for a solution.
100 This is not to suggest that it is inappropriate for the judiciary to consider legislative concern over judicial activism in interpretation of legislative enactments. In fact,
courts should give deference to clear expressions of intent to maintain the integrity of
the legislative process. For example, in Gallegos v. School Dist. of W Las Vegas, New
Mexico, Judge Hartz, in concurring, observed that the state legislature had expressly
repudiated a state supreme court decision applying an expansive reading of the term
"maintenance" in the context of deficient maintenance of the state highway in an
action brought under the state's Tort Claims Act. 858 P.2d 867, 870 (N.M. Ct. App.
1993). An amendment to the Act expressly excepted from the definition of "maintenance" activities that had been inferred from use of the term by the court in Miller v.
New Mexico Dep't of Transp., 741 P.2d 1374 (N.M. 1987). In Gallegos, the plaintiff
asserted negligent placement of a bus stop on the highway. 858 P.2d at 868. Judge
Hartz concurred in application of a pre-amendment reading of the term because the
accident giving rise to the cause of action had pre-dated the 1991 amendment of the
Act. Id. at 871. Nevertheless, he observed: "When the legislature demonstrates discontent with judicial construction of its enactments, however, it is time for the courts
to reconsider their precedents." Id. at 870.
101 See, e.g., Lewis v. Rowland, 701 S.W.2d 122, 123-24 (Ark. 1985) (holding a child's
claim for loss of consortium, due to the loss of a parent, need be legislatively created).
102 ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 32. In a dissenting opinion in Texas Workers' Compensation Comm'n v. Garcia, 862 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993),Justice Peeples argued
that the majority's action in striking down the act restructuring the state's workers'
compensation system was unprincipled as an abuse of judicial discretion because the
Texas Legislature has traditionally been constitutionally empowered to create and
regulate the compensation law. Id. at 114-15 (Peeples, J., dissenting). The dissent
concluded: "We must uphold economic legislation unless it clearly violates individual
rights or is outside the bounds of legislative authority set by the constitution." Id. at
130 (Peeples, J., dissenting).
103 Even an admitted pro-labor observer conceded the existence of a fiscal crisis
resulting from skyrocketing workers' compensation insurance premiums. Davis, supra
note 12, at 27. The observer noted that "[a]s we entered the 90's, premiums paid by
employers for workers' compensation insurance had risen to strangling levels, primar-
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The legislative process is far more appropriate for broad factfinding than judicial consideration of competing information in individual cases. However, recent judicial history indicates that
courts often serve as effective fact-finders in instances in which
broad policy concerns are involved.' 04 Moreover, legislative factfinding is necessarily the product of information input that often
favors interest groups capable of amassing data and influencing the
legislator's opinion, rather than broad-based considerations of policy changes. One need look no further than the Congressional debate over the Clinton stimulus and initial budget packages to
observe that special interests are able to exert pressure on legislators that may fail to serve more general national interests.105
Additionally, the proper judicial function includes preserving
individual rights against majority preference. 0 6 The General Assembly's directive for strictly construing the Act threatens the traditional role of the judiciary by reserving for the legislative branch
the authority to make necessary changes in the compensation
scheme to protect individual rights. 0 7 Yet, if the rights involve a
single claimant, or class of claimants, the likelihood that the legislative branch will actually address the grievance is too remote to warily due to the sky-rocketing cost of medical treatment. The Arkansas Insurance Department granted a[n] 18.5% rate increase in 1992. The heat was on." Id.
104 See infra note 98; Lewis v. Rowland, 701 S.W.2d 122, 123-24 (Ark. 1985).
105 See, e.g., 139 CONG. REc. S4532-34 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg) (discussing the new budget stimulus programs for transportation, community development and wastewater treatment); 139 CONG. REC. S4602 (daily ed.
Apr. 19, 1993) (statement of Sen. Byrd) (discussing the new budget stimulus programs for SBA loan guarantees, AIDS research and airport development grants); 139
CONG. REc. H2090 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1993) (statement of Rep. Kyl) (discussing The
Pork Book, a publication of the Citizens Against Government Waste).
106 Concurring in Texas Workers' Compensation Comm'n v. Garcia, 862 S.W.2d
61, 108 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993), Justice Biery argued that the majority's approach to
invalidating the reform measure was predicated on the court's obligation to "review[ ]
the statute in question as it impacts several provisions written by the sovereign people
in the Texas Bill of Rights, including equal protection, due course of law, right to jury
trial, and open courts." Responding to the argument that the legislature has traditionally been accorded deference in defining the scope and operation of the workers'
compensation system, Justice Biery continued: "If historical common law rights are to
be abrogated by legislative action, it seems axiomatic that such regulatory schemes
should provide a level playing field for all those affected by the statute, and fulfill the
covenant in our social contract that all will be treated fairly." Id. (Biery, J.
concurring).
107 1993 Ark. Acts 796, § 35 (codified at ARK- CODE ANN. §§ 11-9-1001 (Michie
Supp. 1993)).
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rant serious consideration. Traditionally, the courts engage in this
type of correction to preclude unfair legislative applications that
deny individual rights.
Beyond concern for enforcing individual rights under the law,
the General Assembly's attempt to restrict future judicial intervention in the enforcement of rights guaranteed by the state's workers' compensation law itself suggests an attempt to insulate
legislative action from judicial review. Clearly, at least with regard
to section 6 of the Act, 10 8 the General Assembly expressly sought to
annul Arkansas decisions recognizing a civil remedy for retaliatory
discharge of workers' compensation claimants. The legislative action apparently runs afoul of the state's constitution. 10 9
The state constitution grants the General Assembly the ability
to regulate recovery of work-related injuries and create the state's
workers' compensation system. 110 The constitutional authority for
this regulation reads:
The General Assembly shall have power to enact laws prescribing the amount of compensation to be paid by employers for
injuries or death of employees, and to whom said payment shall
be made. It shall have power to provide the means, methods,
and forum for adjudicating claims arising under said laws, and
for securing payment of same. Provided, that otherwise no law
shall be enacted limiting the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death or for injuries to persons or property; and
in case of death from such injuries the right of action shall survive, and the General Assembly shall prescribe for whose benefit
such action shall be prosecuted.1 '
The provision clearly authorizes the creation of a workers' compensation system and for regulation of recoveries, including the setting of
benefit levels. 1 ' Nowhere does the provision authorize the General
Assembly to regulate the employment relationship generally. How108

1993 Ark. Acts 796, § 6 (codified at ARY.

1993)).
109 ARi.
110 Id.
I Id.
112

CoNsT. art. 5,

CODE ANN.

§ 11-9-107 (Michie Supp.

§ 32.

See, e.g., Odom v. Arkansas Pipe & Scrap Material Co., 187 S.W.2d 320 (Ark.

1945) (upholding constitutional delegation of authority to the General Assembly to
create workers' compensation system limiting recovery for work-related injuries);
Baldwin Co. v. Manner, 273 S.W.2d 28 (Ark. 1954) (holding authority to regulate
recovery for industrial accidents limited to situations in which employer/employee
relationship established).
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ever, the General Assembly attempted to do this in the Act by "annulling" judicially recognized civil actions for employer discrimination
aimed at employees filing compensation claims." 3 Despite the General Assembly's apparent goal of reinforcing the employment at-will
doctrine,' 1 4 its effort to do so violates the strict reading of its own
constitutional authority that it imposes on the Arkansas judiciary in
enforcing the amended Act.
The apparent hostility with which the General Assembly has publicly rebuked the executive and judicial branches in their administration of prior workers' compensation law virtually invites judicial
retaliation. This retaliation might be manifested through strict construction of the legality of various aspects of the Act and its attempt to
limit compensation system expansion."5 Such an exercise of'judicial
power would effectively continue the jurisdictional struggle that has
marked Arkansas politics over the past decade.
V.

Conclusion

The General Assembly's enactment of a workers' compensation reform program reflects a local response to a problem of national origin. Increasingly, legislative bodies are confronted by
industrial and management demands for limiting recoveries for
personal injuries. While reform-minded legislators are concerned
about advancing business and insurance interests, the manner in
which the Act openly vilifies judicial enforcement of prior workers'
compensation law hardly promotes the orderly development of
legal theory. The tenor of the General Assembly's action opens a
wound characterized by a legislative/judicial struggle for
supremacy in developing Arkansas law.
In contrast to the typical, evolutionary progression of judicial
113 1993 Ark. Acts 796, § 6 (codified at Am. CODE ANN. § 11-9-107 (Michie Supp.
1993)).
114 In "annulling" the state supreme court's decisions recognizing civil remedies for
wrongful discharge, the General Assembly sought to supplant the civil action with
increased criminal penalties and a new administrative remedy to address the problem
of employer discrimination. By enacting these alternative remedies, the General Assembly expressly stated that it did not intend these alternative remedies to constitute
exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine. 1993 Ark. Acts 796, § 6 (codified at
Aiix CODE ANN. § 11-9-107(d) (Michie Supp. 1993)) ("This section shall not be construed as establishing an exception to the employment at will doctrine.").
115 1993 Ark. Acts 796,

1993)).

§ 1 (codified at Auc.

CODE ANN.

§ 11-9-101 (Michie Supp.
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doctrine, legislative action often involves major, abrupt changes
that reflect changing public policy interests. In this sense, the creation or modification of any compensation system may appropriately lie within the province of the legislative branch. However,
enforcement of legislative enactments ultimately is vested in the
judiciary. Open castigation and hostility toward judicial exercise of
power threatens the stability of the compensation system as counsel, administrative law judges and administrators struggle to anticipate the next round of confrontation leading to changes in
philosophy or approach.
In addition, instability ultimately threatens the very business
and insurance interests that have pressed for the current reforms
precisely because of the uncertainty that these reforms will remain
intact, even in the legislative arena. 16 The popularity of reform
may itself lead to reaction imposing a far less favorable regime on
those interests that sought to limit economic exposure in passing
the Act. The consequences are not certain, of course, but a significant round of litigation almost surely is, and the judicial branch
will retain the option of eventually reacting to legislative abrasiveness by striking down sections of the Act.'1 7 Whether it will do so
rests in the discretion of a majority of the Arkansas Supreme Court.
The great irony implicit in the General Assembly's action may
be that in restricting the definition of compensable injury, the "reformed" act may expand the role of traditional negligent injuries
in industrial accident and disease claims."' Plaintiffs' may rou116 Prior to passage of the Act, state labor leaders threatened to revive the issue of
reform through referendum on the general election ballot if the measure was
adopted and signed into law. Nevertheless, the Democratic Governor signed the bill
into law. Pesek et al., supra note 2, at 20-21.
117 For example, the Arkansas courts might ultimately follow the lead of the Texas
appellate court in Texas Workers' Compensation Comm'n v. Garcia, 862 S.W.2d 61
(Tex. Ct. App. 1993), and declare the entire Act unconstitutional as violating state
constitutional provisions protecting individual rights or improperly expanding upon
the authority delegated to the General Assembly in the constitution. See also Gary
Taylor, Battle Raging in Texas: 'Comp' OverhaulStruck Down, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 30, 1993, at
3 (observing that Texas will be watched nationally because business claims cost of
compensation insurance has been reduced following passage of reform measure).
118 This consequence is suggested by other observers. See, e.g., Richard E. Holiman,
A Different Viewpoint: Civil Litigation Reforms of the New Workers' Compensation Act, ARK.
LAw., Summer 1993 at 23. ("The new act specifically removes stress and mental
claims not involving physical injury and certain 'gradual injuries' from coverage
under workers' compensation. Arguably, this would give the green light to claimants
to sue the employer and not be faced with the 'exclusive remedy' defense."); John D.
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tinely elect to bring civil actions assessing employer negligence in
failing to maintain a safe workplace; failing to warn employees of
appreciable risks of injury and disease; failing to properly train employees; failing to protect employees against the hazards of unsafe
work habits of co-workers; and statutory negligence actions based
upon failure to comply with federal and state workplace safety
regulations.
The "exclusive remedy" doctrine, which traditionally has protected employers from the more comprehensive remedies for personal injuries in general tort actions," 9 would ultimately subject
employers to the uncertainties of damage exposure not limited by
the rather low, and certainly controlled, benefit awards of the
workers' compensation law. Thus, despite the General Assembly's
expressed intent to preserve the "exclusive remedy" doctrine in enacting the new compensation law, 121 the legislative limitations on
recovery exposes employers to liability for injuries previously compensated within the compensation system.
Eventually, of course, the compensation carriers' action in denying liability for injuries arguably excluded under the "reformed"
act will create an interesting conflict of interest, as employers confront expanded liability not protected by their compensation coverage. In a sense, the conflict will shift from one pitting claimants
against employers and their carriers to one of employers facing carCopeland, The New Arkansas Workers' CompensationAct: Did the Pendulum Swing Too Far,
47 Api. L. Rtv. 1, 90 (1994) ("In the long-run, however, employers may find that the
new Act only shifts some causes of action from the workers' compensation to tort.
Employers may be increasingly exposed to stress and other non-physical claims that
may result in large awards against them, with corresponding increase in general liability insurance premiums.").
119 For example, in White v. Apollo-Lakewood, Inc., 720 S.W.2d 702 (Ark. 1986),
the plaintiff sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress based upon the employer's assignment of the employee to tasks that were necessarily likely to produce
injury from exposure to highly toxic chemicals used in the production of agricultural
products. Id. A unanimous Supreme Court rejected the contention that the employer's intentional assignment of dangerous tasks to the employee despite the known
risks constituted actionable conduct. Id. at 703.
Rather, the court held that the employee's exclusive remedy under Arkansas law
was to apply for appropriate benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act for any
injury ultimately suffered.
120 See, e.g., 1993 Ark. Acts 796, § 6 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-107(e)
(Michie Supp. 1993)) (legislative intent in annulling decisions or other discriminatory action directed at compensation claimants to preserve the "exclusive remedy"
doctrine).
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riers whose interests lie in denying coverage for compensation.
This will require plaintiff's counsel to seek the more desirable recovery options available upon proof of negligence. Rather then
the unified front presented by employers and compensation carriers who supported the passage of Act 796, the Arkansas compensation system may eventually by compromised by the self-interests of
these allies who seek, respectively, both to assert the benefits of
compensation coverage and to deny liability under the compensation system. Ultimately, carriers and claimants may benefit from
the reform package at the expense of employers now forced to defend general liability claims without the certain benefit of the umbrella of protection traditionally afforded by a liberally-construed
workers' compensation system.

